The Economic War Against Syria - Stop the Wars at Home and Abroad!

by Roberta Rivolta, published on Counter-Hegemonic Studies, December 4, 2024

As ancient as economic wars may be, the use of embargoes as means of coercion experienced a significant acceleration only at the end of the Cold War.

While the collapse of the USSR reduced the risk that a targeted nation could fall into the Soviet Union sphere of influence, the rapid development of economic globalization made countries increasingly dependent on a world trade network that was dominated by the West.

The 1990s were nicknamed “the sanctions decade” due to a surge in the number of coercive economic measures imposed, in the vast majority of cases, by Western states on so-called “hostile” countries.

From 1990 to 2000, full or partial “sanctions” were applied against Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ivory Coast.[1] In the same decade, the United States enforced unilateral measures on 30 different countries,[2] and since then more than 290 different forms of embargo have been placed on about 109 different countries by the United States, Europe and the UN altogether[3].

Even though they often precede, follow and bolster armed conflicts, coercive economic measures are a silent form of aggression that can be easily downplayed as they don’t involve bloodshed. Unlike war casualties, their brutal effects often need careful investigations to be pinpointed. That’s why they can be prolonged indefinitely – as the cases of Cuba, Iran and Syria demonstrate – and are often passed over in silence. Which is the reason why, after ten years of incessant war propaganda, Syria has basically disappeared from Western media.

To be lawful, sanctions can only be adopted within the UN Security Council in response to “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”,[4] as provided for in the Seventh Chapter of the United Nations Charter.

Unilateral coercive measures, instead, are imposed by single countries or group of countries and have no international legal aegis. Still, they have become the favorite weapon of the United States and Europe, which can count on strong and rich economies, built over centuries of plundering and exploitation of other nations’ natural and human resources. Currently, around 40 countries in the world are affected by unilateral coercive measures – whether total, i.e. targeting the entire state, or partial, i.e. targeting specific individuals or entities – imposed by the US, the EU or the UN. None of these countries is located in Western Europe or North America.[5]

The international economic aggression against Syria

In 2011, the United States, backed by an impressive number of European and extra European nations, unleashed a proxy war on Syria, which was immediately followed by an economic aggression.

Actually, the first punitive measures against Syria were launched way back in 1979, when the country was designated as a “state sponsor of terrorism” by the US for its support of Hezbollah and Iran.[6] So far, Syria is the only country that has never been removed from that blacklist, being additionally blamed for providing “haven and support to several terrorist [sic] groups”, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.[7]

Further unilateral measures were issued throughout the 2000s, as acts of retaliation for Syria’s unyielding support of the anti-Zionist resistance, and a new round was added at the onset of the war, in 2011.

The coercive measures launched by the United States and the European Union in 2011 against Syria have been described by the UN as among the “most complicated and far-reaching”[8] ever devised.

They affect every aspect and sector of the country’s economic life, ranging from bans on trade and financial enterprises, to restrictions on the movement of individual citizens and the freezing of their assets.

Specifically, the US measures forbid, among other things, investments in Syria, direct or indirect imports and exports, and trade in petroleum products. They also apply outside the US national territory, preventing, for example, the sale of any goods, produced in any corner of the world, that contain more than 10% of US-made components; and prohibiting the use of the dollar and of any financial instrument linked to the United States.

The European “sanctions” currently include the freezing of assets, and a ban on entry into the Union’s territory, for 316 persons and 86 entities[9], in addition to an embargo on oil, restrictions on investments, the freezing of assets of the Syrian Central Bank within Europe, and restrictions on the export of “dual-use goods”, that is, goods suitable for both civilian and military applications.

Besides the US and the EU, economic measures have also been issued unilaterally by Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the Arab League.

The consequence of this vast and complex picture is that even transactions that would formally be exempt from prohibitions (such as the purchase of medicines and medical equipment) end up being trapped in the tangle of regulations enforced by different countries and entities, with different legal systems and jurisdictional powers: not only the European Union, but each European country involved, and as many as four different US agencies.

Western NGOs, for instance, report insurmountable difficulties in availing themselves of the exemptions provided for humanitarian aid. The main obstacles mentioned are: the high licensing costs, that often exceed the value of the licensed goods and services; the impossibility of bringing money into Syria, and therefore of using donor funds, or even paying the personnel working inside the country; the complications arising from having to deal with different interlocutors, who interpret and apply the rules differently; the abuse of the definition of “dual-use goods” to include, among the others, many kinds of building materials as well as almost all electronic devices (including the computers supplied to the organizations’ personnel).

The UN denounce that the Western coercive measures have “even affected United Nations staff, who reported being refused bank accounts or mortgages from European banks when the word ‘Syria’ appeared in their job title”[10].

The targeting by the US of the Syrian state means that the involvement, at any stage of an operation whatsoever, of an individual that the United States deem associated with the government is enough to incur heavy fines. Fines range from up to one million dollars to prison sentences, and are applied even against those who violate the “sanctions” regime unknowingly.

The same goes for commercial activities, financial transactions, and private banks. It is enough for a bank or a company to have a shareholder classified as close to the Syrian government to risk the US reaction. “However,” wrote UN Special Rapporteur Idriss Jazairy in 2018, “a consequence of years of sanctions is that most, if not all, major Syrian companies that remain in business have ties of some sort with government officials.[11]”

The outcome is what has been called “chilling effect”: the inhibition or discouragement of legitimate transactions for fear of retaliation from the West. Thus, firms soon began to withdraw from any kind of activity involving Syria.

To further worsen the situation, in June 2020 the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into force. The US law signed by Donald Trump adds to the “primary” coercive measures the crushing weight of “secondary” prohibitions. While primary restrictions require compliance only from economic actors within the issuing country, secondary restrictions target third parties, and prevent foreign companies or individuals from trading with the country subjected to primary sanctions. The Caesar Act essentially claims supranational prerogatives and imposes the US law on the entire world, punishing any person or company anywhere entertaining commercial or financial relations with Syria.

An earlier version of the Caesar Act had already been submitted to the Congress in 2016, but stalled in the Senate. In 2019 it was resubmitted and approved.

It is worth noting that between 2016 and 2019 the situation on the ground in Syria had changed significantly. After the liberation of Aleppo (December 2016), Palmyra (March 2017), Deir Ezzor (November 2017) and finally of the rural area around Damascus (May 2018), it was self-evident that the original scheme – overthrow the Syrian government by force – had failed.

In 2018, the Syrian government was already starting to plan the reconstruction of the country, and welcoming the first potential foreign investors. Some local factories, especially in the area of Aleppo, had reopened and were slowly resuming their activity. Part of the international community was starting to acknowledge the West’s defeat, and, in December of the same year, the first signs of rapprochement by Gulf countries were recorded. The United Arab Emirates[12] and Bahrain[13] reopened their embassies in Damascus, and in the Arab League a few voices were raised in favor of readmission of Syria (whose membership had been suspended in 2011)[14].

But in October 2017, the United States, aided by Kurdish separatists, had occupied Raqqa and subsequently the entire north-eastern region of Syria, the country’s richest area in gas and oil, and the most fertile.

In May 2018, Trump abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and in October relaunched heavy sanctions against Iran.

Also in 2018, a catastrophic economic crisis erupted in Lebanon. The crisis was caused by a variety of factors, including the inevitable fallout of the Syrian war;[15] the growing hostility and a financial boycott[16] by the Gulf countries[17] (in 2013, the Gulf Cooperation Council had imposed economic coercive measures on Hezbollah, and in 2016 had labeled the Lebanese resistance front “a terrorist organization”[18]); and several sets of coercive measures issued by the US over the years targeting Lebanese banks, companies and businessmen – and even 100 foreign financial institutions with an address in Lebanon – accused of being related to Hezbollah[19],[20]. In 2019[21] Lebanon declared an economic emergency.

A year later, the Caesar Act was signed into law, with the clear aim of preventing the above-mentioned first signs of openness from maturing into renewed diplomatic and commercial relations. In the meantime, the liberation of Idlib slipped into a phase of stagnation from which it has never emerged.

The consequences in Syria were very serious: the country was economically isolated because of the Caesar Act, its most fertile and resource-rich part was (and still is) occupied by the US troops, and two of its key allies were hit by “sanction” regimes. The collapse of Lebanon in particular was lethal, not only because the two economies have always been closely linked by strong and long-standing commercial ties, not only because the Lebanese banks held 40 to 60 billion dollars belonging to Syrian citizens[22], but also because through Lebanon Syrian companies and people could partially circumvent the economic restrictions.

Syria before the war

Before the war, Syria was the only country in Western Asia that was self-sufficient in food production. It had even turned into a regional exporter, before a four-year-long drought reversed this positive trend.[23] Its commitment in working towards the Millennium Development Goals set by the UN had been praised by a 2010 report that highlighted how, notwithstanding some ongoing difficulties, it had achieved success in “reducing extreme poverty, the improvement in school enrollment rates, and in maternal and child health, combating malaria and HIV/AIDS as well as plans to expand access to clean water and sanitation”.[24]

To cope with the effects of the droughts, the government had established a set of policies to provide food at affordable prices to all citizens, particularly through subsidies. According to a 2011 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, state-owned stores sold basic commodities with a low profit margin or at subsidized prices. Bread was sold at 50 per cent of its cost of production, and a voucher system had been introduced to dispense rice and sugar to all registered households each month. This distribution system was universal in coverage. And it had coaxed private traders to reduce their profit margins on the same commodities.[25]

The same report lauded the actions taken by the Syrian government in the areas most affected by the drought: not only food assistance, but also subsidized seed, tax breaks and loans to farmers and herders, and measures to favor investment[26].

The Syrian economy in general was one of the strongest in the region, with a reserve of over 2,500 million barrels of oil and 8.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas to rely on[27].

According to the IMF,[28] the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis had been moderate and only restricted to sectors most closely linked with external partners. In 2009 GDP growth had decelerated only by 1 percentage point. A partial slowdown in manufacturing, construction and services had been partly offset by a moderate recovery in agriculture, and a small increase in oil production. The IMF’s own projections for the next two years, and even more so for the medium term, predicted further growth thanks to a more complete resumption of agricultural production.

Government budgetary expenditure had grown by about 5 percent, mainly due to an increase in public investments. According to projections, public debt should have remained at manageable levels.

A report from the WHO registered in 2010 a dramatic improvement of health indicators, compared to the previous three decades: “life expectancy at birth increased from 56 years in 1970 to 72 years in 2006; infant mortality dropped from 123 per 1000 live births in 1970 to 18 per 1000 in 2006; under-five mortality dropped significantly to 22 per 1000 live births; and maternal mortality fall from 482 per 100 000 live births in 1970 to 58 in 2006”. Access to health services had increased since the 1980s, and the gap between urban and rural areas was narrowing. The number of people served by a single medical doctor was 677 in 2006, and investments in public health sector had increased from 1.1% in 1980 to 4.17% of total government expenditure[29].

Syria offered all its citizens free health care and its pharmaceutical industry covered between 85% and 91% of the country’s demand[30]. “The Syrian pharmaceutical industry is producing good quality medicine based on international standards. The provision of safe and effective medicines is based on the essential medicine list. The government goal is monitoring the pharmaceuticals to ensure quality control. The results of quality control have been very good” stated the WHO report.

Education was mandatory until the age of 15 and free until university[31]. At the beginning of the war, Syria was one of the very few Arab countries that had succeeded in providing universal primary education. According to the World Bank, in 2009 the government’s expenditure on public education amounted to 19,2% of its GDP (against 12,7% in the US, and 8,9% and 9,2% in France and Germany, respectively)[32]. The literacy level stood at 92.4 percent for young people aged 15–24 years [33]. Students were guaranteed free textbooks, and public transportation at a symbolic price. University fees were very low.

According to IMF data, again, public debt was the lowest in the last 20 years, having fallen from 190% of GDP in 1990 to 30% in 2010[34].

On May 1, 2010, the then Finance Minister Mohammad al-Hussein announced that Syria had settled all debts with foreign countries, after signing a last agreement with Bulgaria[35].

The previous year, Damascus Securities Exchange, the first stock exchange of the country, had reopened after a 40-year closure[36], with the aim of upgrading Syria’s financial system and encouraging foreign investment[37].

The country exports had risen from 7.19 billion dollars in 2000 to 19.92 billions in 2010[38], while imports had only risen from 29.2% of GDP to 31,8% (World Bank data)[39].

The dollar was worth 47 Syrian pounds, an exchange rate among the top 40 in the world, and one of the highest among countries impoverished by Western colonialism. Even the difference between the official exchange rate and the black market rate had nearly disappeared[40].

Tourism had grown by 40% compared to the previous year, stimulated by President Bashar al Assad’s diplomatic initiatives to enhance Syria’s historical and artistic heritage, by government investments in tourist facilities and by policies to promote tourism especially from neighboring countries (in this regard, the scrapping of visa requirements for Iranian citizens, a bilateral agreement reached in February 2010, raised the ire of the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton[41]). In 2010, Syria had welcomed eight and a half million tourists, for a turnover of 8.4 billion dollars; and over 10 million visitors were expected for the following year[42].

The collapse of the Syrian economy

During an interview on 31 October 2019, President Assad said that during the war, the Syrian government had implemented secret measures to prevent the collapse of the local currency[43]. Indeed, for many years, the Syrian pound held up relatively well.

In July 2016, after five years of direct intervention in the market, the Central Bank was forced to turn to a a policy of non-intervention when its foreign reserves reached a very low level[44].

In 2017, the dollar experienced its first dramatic surge. A second sharp increase occurred in 2019, due to the Lebanese financial crisis; and a third in 2021 after the implementation of the Caesar Act[45].

The isolation of the Syrian banking sector from the international financial system, imposed by the Western community, has cut Syria’s access to foreign currency markets. While, because of the war, Syrian exports decreased and imports increased, the need for foreign currency to finance the import of basic goods has raised the demand for US dollars and contributed to the Syrian pound’s steep fall[46].

Today one dollar, which was worth 47 pounds in 2010, has reached a value of 13,100 Syrian pounds[47].

While in 2018 the military operations, after the liberation of the rural area of Damascus, entered an ongoing stalemate phase, the economic siege has continued its work of destruction amid widespread carelessness.

Today the country would need external resources to rebuild its destroyed infrastructure, its social fabric, its economy.

As President Assad declared to the Italian journalist Monica Maggioni (November 2019): “Talking that Syria has no money… no, actually Syrians have a lot of money; the Syrian people around the world have a lot of money, and they want to come and build their country. Because when you talk about building the country, it is not giving money to the people, it’s about getting benefit – it’s a business. So, many people, not only Syrians, want to do business in Syria. So, talking about where you can have funds for this reconstruction, we already have, but the problem is that these sanctions prevent those businessmen or companies from coming and working in Syria.”[48].

The blacklists target the few wealthy people who could bring money to Syria and contribute to reconstruction, by blocking their accounts abroad.

Remittances from Syrian expatriates, an important component of a “developing” country’s economy, are hindered by the embargo, and Syrian government’s financial assets are frozen in European banks.

The attempts at restoring the industrial production, and reconstructing factories destroyed by terrorists, have been frustrated by currency fluctuations, by the difficulty in accessing hard currencies and the increase in operating costs, by fuel shortages and bans on financial transactions[49].

The same obstacles hindering domestic production affect the cost and feasibility of imports, making it difficult to obtain raw materials and spare parts for the machines.

So, after some efforts at resuming their activities, many companies were forced to close again.

The same goes for agricultural production, which is severely hampered by the inability to import fertilizers and other chemicals, and by shortages of water, fuel and electricity.

Foreign companies don’t want to trade with Syria because of the Caesar Act, and international business dealings are further impeded by shipping problems. Many international transport companies avoid travel to Syria; and insurance companies refuse to cover cargoes bound for Syria, or impose prohibitive tariffs.

As for gas and oil, the main fields are located in the areas now controlled by the United States. If Syria used to export oil and electricity, now it must import them.

GDP has collapsed from 252.52 billion dollars in 2010, to 8.97 in 2021[50]. Foreign currency reserves have been depleted.

The unemployment rate, which was 8.6% in 2010, reached an all time high of 15.30% in 2020[51].

Likewise, the inflation rate, which had averaged 4.4% between 2000 and 2009, peaked at 188% in 2021[52].

According to the latest estimates available, in 2017 public debt had reached 94.8% of GDP[53], to further rise to 130.6% in 2022[54].

The pharmaceutical industry, that had been defined in 2010 “one of the most important pillars of economic and social development in Syria”[55], is struggling to recover. Syria depends on foreign countries for vaccines, medicines and medical supplies. Although these products are formally exempt, “sanctions” prevent in effect their import; both because the Syrian government cannot purchase medicines directly from European or US dealers, both because there is no payment vehicle. Companies are afraid of misstepping and falling under secondary sanctions. Besides, many medical devices use software with contents created in the United States, that can no longer be updated or repaired.

On 28 September 2020, the Syrian government presented its budget for 2021[56]. Public spending had fallen by 70% in 10 years, and it was at its lowest since the beginning of the war. Syrian government revenues had collapsed by 83%. Non-tax revenues had fallen by 90% due to the theft of gas and oil wells in the US occupied areas. The rest, which necessarily fell to citizens, was likewise reduced by impoverishment (according to a report of the World Bank, in 2022 69% of Syrian citizens lived below the poverty line. And extreme poverty, virtually non-existent before the conflict, affected more than one in four Syrians[57]) and by the halving of the population (from 21.4 to 11.7 million). Today the government relies mainly on foreign debt, which is growing out of proportion.

Given the rapidly rising cost of living, most of the budget was earmarked for social support programs: the largest share went to food and fuel subsidies, the second largest one was allocated to rehabilitate the public health sector. Social security and pensions came third; followed by electrical energy services. Little was left, therefore, for the restart of the economy; reconstruction projects received only $66 million, against the $200 billion deemed necessary by the World Bank in 2017[58]. (At a meeting of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia in Beirut, in 2018, this figures had already risen to $388 billion.)

No only unilateral coercive measures are strangling the national economy, but they are also weighing heavily on the daily lives of a population already exhausted by over 10 years of war.

Prolonged power outages and inadequate electricity supply; lack of fuel for cooking, and for electric generators; scarcity of safe water. In 2022, Syrians had to face one of the harshest winters they have ever known without heating.

Gasoline is rationed and queues of cars stretch for kilometers in front of petrol stations. Many public transport vehicles are no longer running, included many school buses, which means that many children, especially those living in the most remote and disadvantaged neighborhoods, cannot reach their classrooms.

Medicines are difficult to find, and many people cannot afford them any more. Hospitals are working way below their capacity, due to electricity cuts, dwindling fuel supplies, broken equipment and extreme shortages of medicines and medical staff. As already mentioned, critical spare parts cannot be imported to maintain or repair essential medical equipment[59].

1 kg of bread, that was about 10 Syrian pounds at the beginning of the war, in 2022 cost about 1,400 Syrian pounds. In March 2024, the cost of the reference food basket presented an 87% increase compared to the previous year[60]. Prices have experienced an almost exponential growth; basic necessities have become very expensive, both due to the devaluation of the currency and inflation, and because they are difficult to find.

The budget approved by the government for 2024 showed a 44% reduction compared to the previous year, and a rise in taxes and business service fees revenues. The share of spending on public subsidies and other support programs was at 18%, against the 30% of 2023. Seeing its general budget deficit constantly growing, in recent years the Syrian government has been forced to cut subsidies in the faint hope to strengthen the economy with investments[61]. “The dynamics of the 2024 draft budget reflect the continuous weakening of the Syrian state and its economic capacity, as well as the sustained drop of the country’s currency” says a report that completely forgets to mention the blockade[62].

Illegality of Coercive Economic Measures

The UN have never approved any sanctions against the Syrian government. The only sanctions voted by the United Nations target terrorist groups fighting in Syria.

What are commonly called “sanctions” are in most cases violations of the international law and should be called “unilateral coercive measures”. These measures infringe the rules and principles governing international relations.

Articles 39, 41, and 49 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provide for the application of sanctions when the Security Council determines “the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression”[63].

More than that, resolution 2625, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 24 October 1970, in consideration of the goal of “developing friendly relations among nations irrespective of their political, economic and social systems” [emphasis added], recalled “the duty of States to refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State”[64].

Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974, declares: “No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights”[65].

Sanctions must be approved by the UN Security Council to be legal, and the international law does not recognize any power of individual states to impose sanctions. Unilateral coercive measures contravene the principle of friendship and cooperation between member states which informs the creation of the United Nations.

Moreover, it’s illegal, according to the international law, to apply any form of pressure with the aim of imposing specific policies or even a regime change within a sovereign state.

In 1975, 35 nations, including the U.S. and most of Europe, signed the Helsinki Final Act, which stated: “The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations. […] They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty”[66].

No less illegal are “partial” coercive measures, such as the US bans against specific individuals and resistance groups designated by the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control), a branch of the US Treasury Department. These measures comply with the US laws and decrees; they have no basis in international law, and are beyond the international control.

Even more so, secondary restrictions undermine the rights of third countries. Under the Obama administration, the US began to impose very large fines on European banks that maintained economic relations with countries under embargo by the US. These fines, too, have no relation to European or international laws, but are imposed by OFAC, under penalty of exclusion from North American financial circuits.

Faced with the abuse of this violent, albeit silent, instrument of aggression, the UN began to take a stand as early as 1984.

On 18 December of that year, Resolution 39/210 called on Western countries to “refrain from threatening or applying trade restrictions, blockades. embargoes and other economic sanctions, incompatible with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and in violation of undertakings contracted multilaterally or bilaterally, against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion which affects their economic, political and social development”[67].

In 2014 the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 27/21 and decided “to appoint, for a period of three years, a Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights”[68].

Exhortations against the use of unilateral coercive measures were reiterated many times in the years, as reminded at the beginning of Resolution 73/167 on Human rights and unilateral coercive measures, 17 December 2018, which, after “Stressing that unilateral coercive measures and legislation are contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States”, condemned, remarkably, “the inclusion of Member States in unilateral lists under false pretexts, which are contrary to international law and the Charter, including false allegations of terrorism sponsorship, considering such lists as instruments for political or economic pressure against Member States, particularly developing countries”[69].

Point 19 then reaffirmed the need to appoint a “special rapporteur” to verify the negative impact of these measures on the enjoyment of human rights in the targeted countries.

The first of these experts was Idriss Jazairy, who during his mandate, from 2015 to 2019, repeatedly denounced the catastrophic consequences of unilateral measures on populations.

In a meeting at the UN, in 2018, he equated them to open warfare, by saying: “Unilateral coercive measures entail some form of collective punishment […]. The practice is not justified under international humanitarian law. Civilians affected should be considered as living in a war zone”[70].

In May 2019, he added: “The resort by a major power of its dominant position in the international financial arena against its own allies to cause economic hardship to the economy of sovereign States is contrary to international law, and inevitably undermines the human rights of their citizens”[71].

Mr Jazairy was succeeded by Alena Douhan, who in 2022, after visiting Syria, exposed the illegal ground on which the US had justified their blockade by saying: “The state of national emergency announced by the U.S. Government in 2003 as the ground for introducing sanctions against Syria, recently extended in May 2022 for another year, does not correspond to the requirements of art. 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).[72]”

Economy as a tool of conquest

Contrary to reiterated statements about unilateral coercive measures not targeting civilians, but only people in power, their specific goal is to affect the populations in order to set them against their governments, as it’s been openly affirmed several times, especially by US representatives.

In 1960, referring to the embargo against Cuba, the deputy secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Lester Mallory, wrote that since “the majority of Cubans support Castro … The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship. … every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba” and to “bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government”[73].

In 1970, Nixon notoriously urged the CIA to “make the economy scream” in Chile to “prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him”[74].

In 2018, Pompeo threatened to starve Iran if its leadership continued to support the anti-Zionist Resistance: “The leadership has to make a decision that they want their people to eat” he said. “That’s the Iranian government’s choice on how to use Iranian wealth. If they choose to […] spoil it [meaning: using it to support the Resistance] I’m very confident the Iranian people will take a response that tries to fix that themselves as well”[75] he concluded.

Either they “act like a ‘normal’ country, or they can see their economy crumble”, he added in a press conference[76].

In June 2020, former US envoy to Syria James Jeffrey, after boasting that “the collapse of the Syrian currency is due to our procedures”[77], went on to note: “We’ve begun to see protests in Druze areas, armed opposition to the regime. The Druze have been generally supportive of Assad, but they are protesting and they’re making it very clear[78]”.

Even more telling are the contents of a book with a curdling title published in 2018, “The Art of Sanctions”.

The author, Richard Nephew, was a White House official during the Obama administration, and earned the name of “sanctions architect” for developing the economic strategy with which the United States unsuccessfully sought to destabilize and subdue Iran.

Nephew’s strategy centers on the concept of “pain”. His book, as he writes, focuses on: “how sanctions cause pain, how pain works, how pain translates into action by those who suffer it”.

Nephew calls his personally engineered embargo against Iran a “stunning success” because it has destroyed the country’s currency and economy, causing inflation and mass unemployment.

In 2012-2013, Nephew notes with satisfaction, Iran faced a shortage of medicines and medical devices. “Not because their trade was prohibited,” he explains, “but rather because they cost too much for the average Iranian, due to their scarcity and the depreciation of the Iranian currency.”

The United States, he continues, chose “NOT” [uppercase in the original] to impose sanctions on luxury goods. With the Iranian population technically able to purchase them, as their import was not hindered, but in actuality unable to do it because of the exorbitant exchange rate, only the rich and men of power could afford them. “Hard currencies were flowing out of the country while luxury goods were flowing in” causing economic inequality and inflation.

It is interesting to recall, in relation to luxury goods, the wave of indignation that swept through Syria in October 2020, when a local telephone company announced the sale in Damascus of the very expensive latest model of iPhone, whose price was prohibitive for the average citizen (4 million Syrian pounds). The phone went on sale just 10 days after Apple announced its release, choosing Syria – of all places – as the first country in West Asia to launch it exclusively.

The operation was plausibly conducted with the approval of Washington, which on September 30 had issued an exemption relating to transactions with the Syrian telephone company expiring on December 30, 2020[79].

To amplify the people’s dissatisfaction, Nephew needed an echo chamber. That’s why, as he wrote at page 113 of his book, “The United States has continued to expand the ability of U.S. and foreign companies to sell personal communications technology to Iranians, helping to ensure that Iranian citizens have the ability to learn about their country’s dire economic straits and communicate with one another.”

It is therefore evident that coercive measures are, from their conception and not by “unintended” fallout, aimed at instigating citizens against their governments, by making their life miserable.

Still, as the quotes about Cuba and Chile demonstrate, the need to starve a population in order to turn it against its government implies that the targeted nation has no revolutionary ambition in itself.

The weaponization of philanthropy

All sources, including the European Union website, agree that the economic measures imposed on Syria are harming the population. Then, it should stand out as an inconsistency that, while on the one hand Europe has been damaging the Syrian economy for a decade – lengthening year after year the list of businessmen, military officers and politicians whose funds are frozen in their banks – on the other hand it portrays itself as a champion of the Syrian people.

Unless we look beyond hypocritical statements of protocol.

Since the beginning of the crisis, the EU has sent over 33 billion euros to Syria[80]. Even if we wanted to ignore the crucial question of who are the real beneficiaries of these donations, the discrepancy between this show of solidarity and the punitive policies that are squeezing the country’s economy – starving its population and forcing it to a life of hardship and struggle – remains surprising.

As President Assad explained in the aforementioned interview with Monica Maggioni: “When we talk about rebuilding the country, we are not talking about giving money to the people, but about creating benefits, creating economic activities”.

Western charity – from governments, NGOs and international organizations – is working exactly in the opposite direction: with one hand it distributes money and comfort goods among the population, with the other it ensures that the Syrian state remains powerless and without resources of its own. And consequently, politically blackmailable.

On 19 October 2019, US president Donald Trump announced to his nation that, thanks to a profitable collaboration with the Kurdish militias on the one side and Turkey on the other, the US had taken control of the oil in north-eastern Syria[81]. One month later he assured his citizens that US troops would keep control of the oil fields[82].

While oil revenues have always been a major part of the Syrian economy, accounting for a quarter of its GDP[83], its production, with its 385,000 barrels per day[84] before the war, it’s irrelevant if compared with the 22 million barrels produced in the US[85]. And even more so if we consider that during the war these revenues have collapsed to a mere tenth of what they were.

The illegally occupied provinces of eastern and north-eastern Syria are not only rich in oil, but also part of the Fertile Crescent, the most productive land of the whole region. They cover 50% of Syria’s irrigable lands, 70% of its energy resources, and 95% of its water potential”[86].

In May 2020, the US online newspaper International Business Times published a report attesting that president Trump had ordered the launch of thermal balloons over the fields of the Syrian governatorate of al Hasakah, to burn down 20 hectares of wheat crop[87].

It’s easy to infer that one of the goals of US military presence in the country is depriving it of its riches.

In the years, many international institutions have raised the alarm about growing poverty rates in Syria, but instead of calling for the withdrawal of occupying armies and an end to all forms of economic coercion, they have repeatedly called for “unhindered humanitarian access”.

If we look closely into all these appeals, though, we realize that even when they speak of “Syrians”, what these agencies are really concerned about are terrorists’ havens, such as Idlib and Rukban camp[88].

The ambiguity of their language seems to have a double purpose: on the one hand, it hides the blatant contradiction between their condemnation of terrorism in Syria and their commitment in helping terrorists; on the other hand, it builds a rhetoric that may be serving a broader scope.

It is perhaps no coincidence that when the NGO Equipo Nizkor wrote a report in 2015[89] on the negative effects of “sanctions” in Syria, they, like many others, seemed to worry less about the destruction of the country’s economy and more about the obstacles prohibitions posed to the penetration of humanitarian aid.

It is certainly no coincidence that the US envoy to the United Nations, Linda Thomas Greenfield, in 2022 recalled that “Without the UN, 70% of food needs [in Syria] will go unmet”[90].

Since 2023, Gulfsands Petroleum – a British oil company that operated in the al Hasakah governatorate until 2012, when it suspended its activities due to the EU coercive measures – has been promoting a plan called “Project Hope”[91]. Their proposal would provide that international oil companies resumed their work in north-eastern Syria, and the revenues from oil extraction, which now fall in the hands of terrorists and Kurdish separatists, would be paid into an escrow account and used to fund humanitarian programs throughout the country. The company exposes the illegality of current oil extraction by the militias occupying that part of Syria, and even displays on its website a counter of the “Barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) misappropriated from the Syrian people [emphasis added] since January 2017”[92], but at the same time they seem totally unconcerned over the illegality of diverting those revenues from their legal owner: the Syrian state. As long as it’s for “humanitarian purposes”.

The general impoverishment of the national economy forces the government to reduce its intervention in the protection of public health and well-being. And it virtually compels the Syrian people to depend on so-called humanitarian aid.

The economic coercive measures, and the obstacles they oppose to “humanitarian aid”, as denounced by Equipo Nizkor, mean that aids can enter Syria only through UN agencies or the biggest international NGOs – all of which are closely tied to the same governments that impose the blockade – and almost completely exclude Syrian associations.

“It cannot be justified” wrote Idriss Jazairy in 2018, “ that basic humanitarian needs are denied to the State, only for some to be resupplied through humanitarian aid, according to the priorities of donors and aid agencies..[93]”

After failing to overthrow the legitimate government of Syria, the Western community is trying to replace it.

While all Western media are passing over in silence the destruction of the Syrian economy caused by unilateral coercive measures, many international institutions and NGOs are still producing a huge amount of reports that grieve over the plight of the Syrian people. They offer data, statistics, analysis, but they all show a tendency to downplay, or more often even ignore, the role of the blockade enforced by the West, trying to attribute the collapse of the Syrian economy to endemic flaws of its political and financial systems.

Significantly, a report published at the end of 2019 by the European University Institute was entitled: “The Deep Root of the Depreciation of the Syrian Pound”[94]. The “Executive Summary” of the paper made no reference at all to Western economic dictates, and got to the point of stating: “the roots of this depreciation are much more structural than conjunctural”. When “sanctions” are included, in the following section, they are mentioned alongside “unnamed ‘foreign hands and conspiracies’”, as one of the pretexts that Syrian politicians would allegedly resort to in order to obscure their inadequacy.

Though, the figures relating to the economic growth and social progress that Syria was experiencing before the war, even in the midst of ongoing challenges, deny these attempts to flip responsibility.

Regardless, while blogs and news websites inflame the frustration of the Syrian people, in the hope of turning them against their government (“Syrians in government-held areas should be careful not to believe the Assad regime’s false promises and brace themselves for even more belt-tightening”[95], recommends an article provided by a news website based in Abu Dhabi), most Western analysis seem to aim at portraying the Syrian government as ineffective and incapable – or worse, unwilling – of taking care of its citizens. As if this supposed incompetence could justify Western protracted interference and desire for intervention in Syria’s internal affairs.

As a matter of fact, some keywords recur obsessively in all these appeals: the above mentioned call for open access to humanitarian aids, and – paradoxically enough – the implementation of Resolution 2254.

One of the latest Security Council briefings on Syria was held on 22 June 2024.

The press release of that hearing bears the title: “Special Envoy for Syria Urges All Actors ‘Engage with UN to Move Forward Political Process in Line with Resolution 2254”[96].

Resolution 2254 was adopted by the Security Council in 2015 – when the situation in Syria was radically different from now – and called for a “political transition process” that pretended to ignore that the political opposition in the country was represented by terrorist militias (not so) covertly funded and armed by the West[97].

If Syria has not yet seen an end to this bloody war, it’s only due to the support that the Western community is still offering to terrorists barricaded in Idlib and other havens, and to the illegal presence in its territory of foreign armies, namely US and Turkish troops.

The numerous amnesties granted by the presidency for crimes of desertion and terrorist acts (murders excluded)[98], and all the steps taken to facilitate the return of refugees show not only the will, but also the feasibility of restoring a stable social peace. But even if this were not the case, it isn’t and it has never been competence of the international community to meddle in Syria’s internal affairs.

And yet, still today, most studies on the Syrian economic situation conclude by reaffirming the need for a “regime change”. As in the case of Pompeo with Iran, the legitimate government – “guilty” of refusing to bow to Western pressure – is blamed for the crisis, and not the Western countries who planned and provoked it.

A country that cannot sustain itself without foreign assistance is easy prey to blackmail and intimidation.

If the hardships resulting from military and economic wars are not enough to turn the population against its leader, the West is eager to play the card of Syria’s dependence on foreign aid and loans to cling to their goal of regime change.

The impunity with which Israel has been bombing unharmed civilians in Gaza and Lebanon for more than one year now is only a more blatant version of the same impunity with which the West has been illegally starving entire populations for decades. The international law and institutions have always been hostages to the brutal arrogance of the West. And the rhetoric of human rights has always been wielded as a sword, since when the Pilgrims brandished the crucifix to legitimize the extermination of the Native Americans, a long time ago.

Today our eyes are on Gaza and on Lebanon, and every voice risen in defense of these populations under aggression gains credibility and consideration. But among these voices, there are many – news websites, journalists, analysts, and activists – that for more than ten years lent themselves as sounding boards for the Western propaganda against Syrian President Bashar al Assad.

On 22 January 2024 the EU website stated: “Syria continues to be a high priority for the EU. […] After more than a decade, the conflict is far from over. It is therefore necessary to maintain and ensure the effectiveness of the restrictive measures in place by further developing them[99]”.

The Zionist propaganda army is profiting from the Palestinians’ suffering to regain legitimacy, and infiltrate Resistance supporters with renewed impetus. The war against Syria is still raging.

*Featured Image: US Adds New Sanctions on Syria, 2020 ~Sameer ANI

[1]https://carnegieendowment.org/events/2000/04/sanctions-decade-assessing-un-strategies-in-the-1990s?lang=en; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-06/news/un-imposes-arms-embargo-ethiopia-and-eritrea; https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/4075/05iie4075.pdf, pag 132

[2]https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/4075/05iie4075.pdf, pag 125,

[3]https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/easier-in-than-out-the-protracted-process-of-ending-sanctions

[4]https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7 , https://untso.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/united_nations_charter.pdf

[5]https://www.blockpass.org/major-sanctioned-countries-lists/, https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main the US are on the EU list only pursuant to a directive to protect the EU interests against the extraterritorial measures taken by the US. A legislation that have proved completely ineffective, as the Iran’s case demonstrated

[6](https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/syria/)

[7]https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2000/2441.htm, https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/hrw/2002/en/29582

[8]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g18/298/17/pdf/g1829817.pdf (para. 12)

[9]https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/28/syria-council-renews-restrictive-measures-and-extends-humanitarian-exemption-for-another-year/

[10]https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/ineffective-immoral-politically-convenient-americas-overreliance-economic-sanctions#humanitarian-costs-sanctions

[11]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g18/298/17/pdf/g1829817.pdf (para. 21)

[12]https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-emirates-idUSKCN1OQ0QV/

[13]https://www.arabnews.com/node/1426946/middle-east

[14]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/26/arab-league-set-to-readmit-syria-eight-years-after-expulsion

[15]https://www.arabianbusiness.com/middle-east/lebanon-central-bank-riad-salameh-467444

[16]https://www.frstrategie.org/en/programs/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/saudi-arabian-uncertainties-lebanon-january-2011-january-2017-2017

[17]https://gulfif.org/lebanons-economic-hardship-is-yet-another-arena-for-gulf-states-rivalry/

[18]https://www.reuters.com/article/world/gulf-arab-states-label-hezbollah-a-terrorist-organisation-idUSKCN0W40X0/

[19]https://blog.blominvestbank.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/The-impact-of-U.S.-sanctions-on-the-lebanese-economy-1.pdf, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0069

[20]https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-imposes-sanctions-on-lebanese-man-company-for-hezbollah-links-idUSKBN0UL284/

[21]https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/7/threat-of-us-sanctions-looms-over-lebanons-hezbollah-allies

[22]https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-07-17/syrias-assad-says-funds-frozen-in-lebanese-banks-biggest-impediment-to-investment

[23]Before the March 2011 uprising, Syria was the only country in the region that was self-sufficient in food production and especially in staple agricultural crops such as wheat and barley. It had even turned into a regional exporter before a major drought in 2008–2009 forced the country to import large quantities of wheat for the first time in many years. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2015/06/food-insecurity-in-war-torn-syria-from-decades-of-self-sufficiency-to-food-dependence?lang=en

[24]https://www.undp.org/syria/publications/national-mdgs-progress-report-2010

[25]https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/report-special-rapporteur-right-food-olivier-de-schutter-addendum

[26]https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1086.pdf

[27]https://actualidad.rt.com/opinion/alberto-rodriguez-garcia/341152-sanciones-aislamiento-miseria-asedio-economico-siria

[28]https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1086.pdf

[29]https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/113234/CCS_Syrian_Arab_Republic_2010_EN_14478.pdf?sequence=1

[30]https://pharmexcil.com/v1/docs/ShortnoteonSyrianPharmaceuticalMarket.pdf , https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/75835/QM-07-23-297-EN-N.pdf?sequence=2%26isAllowed=y

[31]BBC documentary 2011 “Syrian school”

[32]https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GB.ZS?locations=SY

[33]https://www.alessandrobacci.com/2009_10_07_archive.html

[34]https://www.indexmundi.com/syria/public_debt.html

[35]https://www.economywatch.com/syria-claims-its-now-completely-free-of-foreign-debt